This working paper examines the proposed changes to the post-Busan governance structure and provides an analytical framework to assess the merits and challenges for establishing a legitimate governance mechanism for the development cooperation architecture. We argue that the success of Busan in establishing a Global Partnership and making it truly global will depend on the extent to which stakeholders see the governing mechanism as legitimate in terms of its inclusivity, representativeness and effectiveness. Drawing on Graves and Burall's (2008) tripartite notion of legitimacy as inclusivity and representativeness (input legitimacy), quality of decision-making processes (throughput legitimacy), and effectiveness in achieving outcomes (output legitimacy), we develop a framework to analyse post-Busan governance. We expand on the work of Graves and Burall and examine challenges relating to developing country ownership over the global agenda and capacity for engagement, which are important contributing factors to the legitimacy of the Global Partnership. While our analysis focuses on the HLF processes, it has value for broader discussions on international economic governance where many of the same tensions and trade-offs exist.
The following conclusions and policy recommendations emerge from our analysis:
 In addition to inclusivity and representativeness, the input legitimacy of the Global Partnership will be determined by the extent to which developing countries have ownership over the global agenda and capacity to engage in its governing structures.
 To ensure throughput legitimacy -high quality, evidence-based discussions and policymaking -the Global Partnership will require analytical inputs to inform its work that move past simple monitoring and evaluation. Participants in the Global Partnership will need to decide how the partnership's associated structures, as well as the work of other institutions, such as universities, think tanks, civil society organizations, and multilateral organizations, will contribute. In this context, it will be important to ensure that discussions are informed by Northern and Southern perspectives.
vi  The monitoring of Busan commitments at the global level should be informed by a comprehensive set of indicators that draw on existing monitoring processes to the fullest extent possible.
 To reduce tension between inclusivity and effectiveness, the Global Partnership needs to have a clearly defined and focused agenda that is at the same time flexible to accommodate a diversity of perspectives. Even a narrow mandate that concentrates on aid issues -in order to take care of the unfinished aid agenda -will need to afford space for a holistic discussion on development, which has long been a priority for most developing countries.
 Funding and burden sharing for the Global Partnership have to be clearly sorted out, especially for developing countries that are lacking in capacity and to ensure that they are properly represented.
 Finally, the Global Partnership should be structured in such a way as to allow for evolution as the issues, priorities and challenges facing development cooperation change.
Introduction
The current international aid architecture, broadly defined as the set of structures and institutions for delivering aid, is often described as dysfunctional and uncoordinated. Despite attempts to reform it, this architecture has become increasingly complex and incoherent over time. It is criticized for its multiplicity of modalities and actors for delivering aid, making coordination virtually impossible, and exponential growth in aid projects. The legitimacy of global aid governance has been undermined by insufficient representation and feedback from recipient countries in what some refer to as a Northern or donor-dominated system. This legitimacy gap has been exacerbated by the emergence of new actors represented by South-South development co-operation (SSDC) providers 1 and the private sector, many of whom operate outside established governance structures aimed at improving the effectiveness of aid.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC)-the forum through which major traditional bilateral donors coordinate their aid efforts-have played a central role in establishing norms and evidencebased frameworks to improve the quality of aid. At the High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness, hosted by the OECD-DAC four times between 2003 and 2011, members of the international community established principles, systems for monitoring and evaluating progress against commitments, and lessons learned for improving aid effectiveness. The DAC-hosted Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), launched in 2003, has historically overseen this work, organized HLF processes, and monitored progress on aid effectiveness. Although the WP-EFF includes bilateral and multilateral donors, recipient countries, some SSDC providers, and civil society actors among its membership, it does not include representation from all countries.
The most recent HLF, the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), was held in Busan, South Korea, from November 29 to December 1, 2011. It took stock of progress made on aid effectiveness and sought to broaden the partnership and the agenda by inviting emerging actors into the fold and shifting discussions from aid to 'effective development co-operation'. A key goal in this context was to establish a legitimate new global partnership that would include all actors engaging in development co-operation.
The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (BP) endorsed at the end of HLF4 committed to forming a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 2 (Global Partnership) 'to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level ' (HLF4 2011, 12) . Participants in the BP will decide on the mandate and structures for the Global Partnership by June 2012, when it formally takes over from the WP-EFF.
1 SSDC providers include countries like Brazil, China, India, Russia, Turkey, South Africa and Venezuela, for example. We use the term SSDC providers because other terms used to refer to these actors such as emerging or non-DAC donors are misnomers. The word 'emerging' reflects the notion of 'new', yet some donors such as China have been providing aid for decades. Non-DAC donors defines providers of SSDC by what they are not rather than what they are (Davies 2012) . 2 Throughout the paper we use the term 'development co-operation' only when referring to the post-Busan era and its related governance structures. Prior to Busan, discussions focused on the aid architecture and achieving aid effectiveness. For consistency's sake, we use the terms aid architecture and aid effectiveness to refer to pre-Busan commitments and discussions.
The Global Partnership presents an opportunity for the international community to establish a new governance structure for development co-operation that is more legitimate than the WP-EFF. The WP-EFF's origins lie in traditional donor concerns with effectiveness, and the legitimacy of HLF processes and their outcomes as shared global initiatives. The increasing role of SSDC providers intensifies these concerns, especially given that SSDC providers have historically had little input into these processes. Felix Zimmerman and Kimberly Smith (2011, 733) add that the emergence of new development models, sources of finance, and modes of development co-operation does not help, suggesting that the continued relevance of DAC donors will depend on their ability to engage SSDC providers. Aware of this legitimacy gap, the OECD-DAC and WP-EFF have sought to engage these new actors.
The BP was endorsed by large SSDC providers such as Brazil, China, and India, but with an important caveat. All declarations from HLF are voluntary, yet SSDC providers (notably China) negotiated to explicitly include the word 'voluntary' in the outcome document in relation to their commitments on South-South co-operation; in other words, their commitments are 'voluntaryvoluntary.' Observers suggest that this effectively allows SSDC providers to keep one foot outside the metaphorical tent. This raises questions as to whether the BP represents a true break from the DAC-dominated aid effectiveness agenda to a new legitimate global partnership for development co-operation. A key concern for the process of developing the Global Partnership is to ensure that the governance structure that emerges is both legitimate owing to its inclusivity and mandate, and effective in overseeing commitments made in Busan. The Global Partnership builds on past efforts by the WP-EFF to increase its legitimacy through greater participation by developing countries, SSDC providers, the private sector, and civil society. This paper examines the proposed changes to the post-Busan governance structure and provides an analytical framework to assess the merits of and challenges in establishing a legitimate governance mechanism for the development co-operation architecture. We argue that the success of the BP in establishing the Global Partnership and making it truly global will depend on the extent to which stakeholders see the governance mechanism as legitimate in terms of inclusivity, representativeness, and effectiveness. Drawing on Sue Graves and Simon Burall's (2008) tripartite notion of legitimacy as inclusivity and representativeness (input legitimacy), quality of decision-making processes (throughput legitimacy), and effectiveness in achieving outcomes (output legitimacy), we develop a framework to analyze post-Busan governance. We expand on the work of Graves and Burall to examine challenges related to developing country ownership over the international agenda and capacity for engagement, two important contributing factors to the legitimacy of the Global Partnership.
In the following section we outline the background and historical context for this debate prior to Busan, including the evolution of the WP-EFF which has sought to become the international platform on aid effectiveness. We demonstrate that HLF processes are firmly grounded in traditional donor concerns with effectiveness, international actors engaging in these processes have recognized the need for the agenda to be more legitimate, and these actors have sought to address this issue through greater inclusivity and representativeness within the WP-EFF and, more recently, through the Global Partnership. This suggests actors engaged in these processes see inclusivity and representativeness as key factors in determining legitimacy. We then present our proposed framework and conclude with the policy implications of our analysis.
While our analysis focuses on HLF processes, it has value for broader discussions on international economic governance in which many of the same tensions and trade-offs exist. The challenges of representativeness and legitimacy are not new for organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, and the growing influence of SSDC providers exacerbates tensions in these areas. The Group of Twenty (G20), with its limited membership, also faces questions regarding its legitimacy as a decision-making body on issues related to development co-operation. As in the case of aid governance, there is consensus that reforms are necessary but discussions on broader aspects of international economic governance have not always yielded concrete results, in addition to being nontransparent.
From Rome to Busan
There is often some confusion about the relationship between the DAC and the WP-EFF. The nature of this relationship is important for our discussion on legitimacy because of the reputational challenges the DAC faces owing to its limited membership (Killen and Rogerson 2010) . Recognizing the importance of this issue, the DAC maintains that it merely 'hosts' the WP-EFF, which it contends is the author of the aid effectiveness agenda. As pointed out by Laurence Chandy and Homi , this distinction is fuzzy given that the WP-EFF is still a committee of the DAC. In addition, the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) of the OECD serves as the secretariat for both the DAC (which determines the DCD's work streams) and the WP-EFF (OECD-DAC 2010) . Despite attempts by the DAC to distance itself from the WP-EFF and its insistence on a distinction between them, the evolution of the aid effectiveness agenda clearly demonstrates where the agenda's roots lie.
Rome Declaration on Harmonisation -2003
In 2001, the DAC established the DAC Task Force on Donor Practices, which had a two-year mandate to 'elaborate a set of good practice papers on how donors can enhance their operational procedures with a view to strengthening partner country ownership' (OECD 2003a, 3) . The original Task Force invited 16 developing country representatives to participate in meetings.
3 In 2003, more than 40 multilateral and bilateral development institutions and 28 recipient countries agreed to harmonize their efforts, adapted to country context, in the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (OECD 2003b) . From Rome, the WP-EFF evolved out of the DAC Task Force on Donor Practices and was established as a subsidiary body of the DAC. Although these efforts were rooted in the OECD-DAC, participation in the international aid effectiveness agenda grew substantially during the 2000s.
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness -2005
In 2005, over 100 countries endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 4 However, the declaration covered less than half of all aid to developing countries when the contributions of private foundations, non-governmental organizations, humanitarian groups, and non-DAC donors were taken into consideration (Kharas and Linn 2008, 3 ). An enduring problem in this regard is the lack of proper recording and accounting (that is, who gives what to whom) of non-DAC aid flows, whether official or private, with no clear fix on the horizon.
5 Civil society organizations (CSOs) criticized the Paris Declaration, calling it a government-to-government accord that not only lacked civil society involvement, but failed to sufficiently link aid to development goals (International Civil Society Steering Group 2008, 2) .
Following Paris, the WP-EFF consisted of 23 bilateral donors, 14 developing countries, and officials from the World Bank, IMF, United Nations (UN) agencies and regional development banks; it was this group that finalized the indicators and targets agreed to in Paris (WP-EFF 2012a) . The composition of the WP-EFF at this time continued to be dominated by donors despite efforts to be more inclusive. Until HLF4, the WP-EFF was responsible for: (1) facilitating implementation of aid effectiveness commitments; (2) monitoring and evaluation of the Paris Declaration and, later, the Accra Agenda for Action; (3) developing and disseminating research, analysis, and messages on aid effectiveness; and (4) organizing high-level for a (Killen 2011, 30) .
United Nations Development Cooperation Forum -2007
In 2007, the UN Economic and Social Council's Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) was created in response to the changing development co-operation landscape and the increasing number of development actors. The rationale for the creation of the DCF was that governance of international development co-operation needed to be more inclusive and democratic, in particular by incorporating the views of Southern partners (Graves and Burall 2008, 13) . The DCF brought together a range of actors from developing and developed countries-including parliamentarians, CSOs, and the private sector-making it a more legitimate forum in terms of inclusivity and representativeness, compared to HLF processes. The DCF's mandate is 'to work to enhance the implementation of the internationally agreed development goals … and promote dialogue to find effective ways to support it' (ECOSOC 2012). In this respect it reviews trends in international development co-operation, promotes coherence among development activities, and seeks to strengthen the normative and operational links in UN work (Graves and Burall 2008) . An important distinction between the DCF and the WP-EFF is that the DCF's activities broadly focus on development co-operation as opposed to just aid. The DCF's work does, however, look at aid quality, mutual accountability, transparency, and results. This work has made important contributions to the aid effectiveness agenda in the past, and fed into the monitoring and evaluation of the Paris Declaration.
Accra Agenda for Action -2008
Before the Third HLF (HLF3) in Accra in 2008, preliminary assessments of progress on the Paris Declaration were released, showing that improvement had not been as fast and as great as originally anticipated. 6 The 2008 Monitoring Survey on the Paris Declaration concluded that without faster reform and implementation, the targets set out in 2005 would not be met by 2010 (OECD 2008a) . Only three of the 12 indicators were 'on track' for the 2010 deadline. Nevertheless, a report released by the WP-EFF was quick to point out that the Paris process had led to several other intermediate achievements such as the creation of a more inclusive dialogue with higher quality debates, empowerment for developing countries, shared standards, and commitments against which to hold governments to account (OECD 2009 ). The OECD also India, Russia, South Africa and the 20 non-DAC donors that report to the DAC were nearly US$11 billion in 2009. 6 Authors of the independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration also pointed out that it was misleading to attribute even marginal gains to the Paris Declaration since many aid effectiveness initiatives were underway before the 2005 agreement (Wood et al. 2008, 3) . considered the monitoring and evaluation processes themselves as instruments of change, citing the addition of new governments that were keen to advance effectiveness in their countries through the evaluation process (OECD 2008a) . Nevertheless, the independent evaluators of the Paris Declaration found that some countries were concerned with the clarity, validity, and purpose of some survey indicators. Some developing countries described targets as 'unhelpful, unrealistic or insufficiently adapted to diverse conditions' (Wood et al. 2008, xiii) .
Despite these challenges, HLF3 sought to accelerate progress 7 and engage more development actors. Efforts made before and after HLF3 indicate that the WP-EFF recognized the importance of inclusivity and representativeness for legitimizing the aid effectiveness agenda as an international partnership. The WP-EFF held extensive consultations on the Accra Agenda for Action before the forum began (DCD/DAC/EFF 2008). The outcome document broadened representation in the aid effectiveness agenda through commitments to deeper engagement with CSOs and parliamentarians, as well as recognizing the importance of South-South cooperation (OECD 2008b) . Following Accra, attempts were made to improve the inclusiveness of the WP-EFF by moving 'from a working party to "the international partnership on aid effectiveness"' (DCD/DAC 2012c). The WP-EFF extended membership from three to five categories including: (1) countries receiving official development assistance (ODA); (2) countries both receiving and providing assistance; (3) donor countries reporting ODA to the DAC; (4) multilaterals; and (5) CSOs, foundations, local governments, and parliamentarians (DCD/DAC 2012c). 8 As part of efforts to become more inclusive, the WP-EFF also established North-South co-chairing (WP-EFF 2010) and gave CSOs a seat on the Executive Committee.
9
The WP-EFF also established a Task Team on South-South Co-operation which collected over 100 cases looking at South-South co-operation and aid effectiveness. In 2010 in Bogotá, the Task Team organized the High Level Event on South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development, the outcomes 10 of which included a commitment to deepen understanding on South-South co-operation by promoting and implementing best practices from the case stories presented. These efforts demonstrate the goal of the WP-EFF to garner greater international legitimacy as well as a perception that broader representation, inclusion, and ownership on the part of developing countries was one way to achieve this goal.
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation -2011
The WP-EFF was marginally successful in accelerating progress on Paris and Accra and opening up international discussions on aid effectiveness. The 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration showed that only one of the 13 targets had been met-coordinating technical assistance (OECD 2011). Policy-makers agreed that timelines were too short and ambition needed to be balanced with realism (Wood et al. 2011, 10) . Further, the independent evaluation and the monitoring survey showed that developing countries had done a better job at meeting their commitments than donors. These failures occurred during a decade when aid volumes had been scaled up considerably. Aid effectiveness debates in the last decade or so focused too much on aid practices and technical mechanisms (such as better aid management and delivery), which, even if necessary, do not address the power imbalances that exist between donors and recipients in day-to-day operations. Not surprisingly, the overall result has been a 7 Accra strengthened commitments to improve the delivery of aid through stronger country ownership of development, greater predictability, better use of country systems, and changing the nature of conditionality (OECD 2008) . 8 See DCD-DAC (2012b) for full list of members. 9 For a summary of the WP-EFF's attempts to democratize following Accra, see Schulz (2009) . 10 For the outcome document, see Steering Committee (2010). lack of real change in development outcomes such as reducing poverty and realizing human rights for example.
In response, the WP-EFF made results a key overarching theme for HLF4. Dismal progress since Accra was recognized as an indication of the need for sustained political will to improve aid effectiveness (Wood et al. 2011, 54) . As such, the WP-EFF focused on establishing a broad political consensus in Busan, moving away from the technical approach taken in previous HLFs.
In a new attempt to involve more development actors, namely the private sector and SSDC providers, HLF4 sought to 'enlarge the tent' by bringing these actors-many of whom had not endorsed the Paris Declaration or Accra Agenda for Action-to the table (DCD/DAC 2011c). This attempt reflected two key concerns.
The first relates to traditional donors' concern with the lack of coordination between and among SSDC providers. The growing literature on these actors has highlighted the differences that exist between a traditional rules-based or standard-setting approach on the part of DAC donors and approaches taken by countries that are both donors and recipients. In particular, although some SSDC providers are signatories to the Paris aid effectiveness principles as recipients, they do not adhere to them as donors, but rather they practice what they loosely define as 'South-South co-operation'.
Although SSDC providers' exact contributions are not known, 11 their increasing real and perceived role has garnered a lot of attention, especially from members of the DAC. On one hand, traditional donors are concerned that many SSDC providers 12 operate independently and outside of existing frameworks such as the Paris Declaration and consider some aspects of their aid delivery (for example, tied aid or failure to take into account good governance by recipient countries) to be undermining the aid effectiveness agenda (Manning 2006; Naim 2007; Paulo and Reisen 2010) . On the other hand, many SSDC providers and recipients claim that their role in development co-operation offers a number of benefits through, for instance, effective partnerships, non-interference, and respect for sovereignty. Moreover, much of what emerging donors do falls outside the traditional criteria for ODA as defined by the OECD-DAC. SouthSouth co-operation includes, inter alia, knowledge exchange, trade and investment provisions, debt relief, and human resources development (Davies 2010; Bräutigam 2011; Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Naidu 2011) . Based on their shared experiences, SSDC providers are seen as better placed to propose development solutions to recipients, leading some to suggest that the development models offered by SSDC providers serve as a challenge to those proposed by traditional donors (Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Davies 2012; Kindornay and Besada 2012; Naidu 2012 ).
Regardless of the opportunities and challenges presented by SSDC providers, the increasing number of official and private actors exacerbates the difficulties of managing multiple financial flows for recipient countries, raising the question of how to achieve effective development co-11 Part of the difficulty in assessing their development co-operation is that SSDC providers do not always make their figures public, nor do they necessarily use the OECD-DAC definition of ODA as their reference point (Davies 2012) . 12 Some SSDC providers, such as Turkey, Poland, and Israel, are seeking a closer relationship with the DAC and report their ODA statistics (see Smith, Fordelone, and Zimmerman 2010) . Chandy and Kharas (2011) suggest that the differences between traditional donors and some SSDC providers are not as far apart as they seem at first glance, claiming that differences arise from how principles such as ownership and harmonization are interpreted by each group. operation without coordinating the multitude of actors. The plethora of donors contributes to fragmentation, creating difficulties for aid management and governance and increasing transaction costs (Kragelund 2008; World Bank 2008; Davies 2010; Killen and Rogerson 2010) . The goal of 'enlarging the tent' in Busan was partly about addressing this issue by establishing common principles between various providers of development assistance.
'Enlarging the tent' was also about giving the aid effectiveness agenda greater international legitimacy. Inclusion and legitimacy were an underlying theme in Busan with the goal of developing 'a broader and deeper partnership at all levels of development, including developing and developed countries, and private and non-governmental organizations' (DCD/DAC 2012c). CSOs called for a more inclusive and just aid architecture (BetterAid 2011), while African countries called for reform of global fora that moves past 'token inclusion of Africa' (NEPAD 2011). The Development Co-operation Directorate of the DAC added that the new consensus might require 'letting go' on the part of the DAC and cautioned that DAC members should proceed on that basis if a truly global consensus were to be achieved (DCD/DAC 2011c, 4). The importance of developing an inclusive and legitimate Global Partnership was well-established in the lead-up to Busan.
The Global Partnership -2012
There was much debate on what an inclusive Global Partnership might look like.
13 Discussions centred on the role of the UN and the OECD, with the former championed for its legitimacy and the latter for its effectiveness and expertise. In Busan, participants agreed to establish the working arrangements of a new partnership platform, yet it was unclear from the outcome document what role existing fora would play. The DCF was invited to 'play a role in consulting on the implementation of agreements made in Busan' and the OECD and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support the partnership. Specifics are to be determined by June 2012, when a new governance structure took over from the WP-EFF.
The Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG) has been established to provide suggestions about possible governance changes to the WP-EFF, the membership of which will give the final approval. Brazil, China, India, and Mexico are members of this group, serving as the larger SSDC providers around the table.
14 An important caveat to their involvement is that Brazil, China, and India maintain that they are participating in the PBIG as active observers (WP-EFF 2012b), which demonstrates their reluctance to fully embrace the new partnership. 15 The question of incentives for SSDC providers to fully engage remains, given lack of clarity on what the new agenda really offers them, the poor track record of the Paris Declaration (why join something that is not working?), and the continued perception that the aid effectiveness agenda is a DAC agenda (Kindornay 2011) . Limited involvement of SSDC providers in the Global Partnership will seriously undermine its legitimacy as an inclusive international partnership.
The PBIG and WP-EFF face many challenges establishing the Global Partnership. Despite the best intentions of HLF meetings on aid effectiveness, the aid system has become far too complex, prompting some to even question the use of the term 'architecture' for a system that is so eclectic (Killen and Rogerson 2010; Kharas, Makino, and Jung 2011) . Even with improvements like the untying of aid and new modalities that try to improve coordination, aid flows remain far too volatile and unpredictable for countries that rely most heavily on them, aid allocation creates both aid orphans and aid darlings, and fragmentation remains a pervasive problem, all of which contribute to reducing the value of actual aid delivered.
Despite the limited gains from Paris and Accra, the BP expanded and deepened commitments beyond aid to include a broader range of development issues such as corruption, illicit capital flight, aid for trade, engagement with the private sector, and climate finance. Busan moved beyond aid and built on Accra, acknowledging the growing importance of SSDC and the private sector in development, and welcoming the 'New Deal' for engagement in fragile and conflictaffected states developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Other positive developments included more power for CSOs to hold governments to account, a reiteration of the importance of mutual accountability and transparency in aid relationships, and commitment to use country systems as the default approach to the provision of development assistance. At the same time, few concrete commitments were actually made (DCD/DAC 2011a). 16 The new Global Partnership will need to reconcile the failures of the past aid effectiveness agenda with the ambitions for effective development co-operation outlined in Busan.
Framework and Criteria for a Post-HLF4 Governance Structure
At the time of writing, the PBIG had already met for a few days in February and April 2012 in Paris to discuss the post-Busan development co-operation architecture. While the primary purpose of the group is to look into how the Global Partnership will be implemented and managed to maintain political momentum, a second but nonetheless important objective is to decide on indicators for monitoring progress. Reflecting Busan commitments, members of the WP-EFF want a structure that is 'global light, country heavy' (WP-EFF 2011a); in other words, one that incorporates a few select indicators at the global level. It is unclear how the monitoring framework from Paris and the broader effective development co-operation agenda will be incorporated into this structure or how country-level monitoring will contribute to global monitoring. Preliminary discussions indicate a reluctance to move beyond aid effectiveness (that is, reviewing progress on implementing HLF4 commitments) to embrace effective development co-operation (that is, address policy coherence for development and global standards). Instead, most participants have advocated for a focused approach and indicated that moving beyond HLF4 commitments would be too much for the Global Partnership to handle.
The PBIG has identified four core functions for the Global Partnership: (1) maintain and strengthen political momentum for more effective development co-operation; (2) ensure accountability for implementing Busan commitments; (3) facilitate knowledge exchange and sharing of lessons learnt; (4) and support implementation of Busan commitments at the country level (WP-EFF 2012b, 3). It will also address future opportunities in effective development cooperation. Regarding the structure for delivering on these functions, the PBIG identified ministerial-level meetings as the main working structure of the Global Partnership, supported by a Steering Committee. In line with the recommendation of the BP, the OECD and the UNDP will jointly provide secretariat support, building on their collaboration and areas of comparative advantage.
17 It remains to be seen how this secretariat will conduct its activities and how this proposed collaboration will unfold. This has important practical implications because the DAC and DCD, despite their efforts, have always been viewed as input-driven by DAC members.
18 A draft concept note by the OECD/UNDP outlining their potential roles in the secretariat gives further cause for concern in this regard. It states that 'the plurality of the organisations' roles and mandates means that each organisation will engage with the Global Partnership on behalf of its respective members and constituencies (for example, UNDP will engage [UN Development Group] members as appropriate)' (OECD/UNDP 2012, 2). While the UNDP would technically represent the UN system, as well as the member states, the OECD would continue to engage on behalf of traditional donors. To the extent that this situation continues in the new Global Partnership, it is highly unlikely that CSOs, developing countries, and SSDC providers will see it as a positive development.
While these discussions within the PBIG continue, we propose criteria below for an effective and legitimate post-HLF4 governance structure. Specifically, we build on Graves and Burall's (2008) conceptualization of legitimacy and include ownership and capacity in our discussion. These are important because they apply to governance of the aid architecture and are relevant for discussions on broader global economic governance, for example the international financial institutions or G20. We use the experiences of the WP-EFF and DCF to illustrate and provide justification for our suggested considerations. We draw from these fora because they deal with the quality of aid and effective development co-operation, include a broad range of development actors in their decision-making processes, represent different models for governing development co-operation that have been considered in international discussions on the future architecture, and provide us with examples of best practice and lessons learned. We do not explicitly discuss the role of multilateral processes like the G20, UN General Assembly, or thematic UN conferences such as the UN Conference on Sustainable Development or the UN Conference on Least Developed Countries. While these processes play an important role in establishing and promoting development policy, they face one or more challenges relating to representativeness, inclusivity, or lack of formal institutionalization. Given that international development policy is also established via these processes, the Global Partnership will have to coordinate with them as well as the growing role of civil society and private sector engagement in UN processes. 17 In a draft concept note on the arrangements for joint OECD-UNDP secretariat support, the OECD and UNDP suggest their roles may include: supporting ministerial-level engagement at the global level; developing and implementing the global monitoring framework which will supplement country-level monitoring efforts; support partnership and accountability frameworks in countries; facilitate learning and knowledge sharing; and advocacy and outreach, including efforts to engage the DCF, G20, and DAC (OECD/UNDP 2012, 1). 18 Jonathan Glennie (2010, 4) similarly points out that OECD staffers played a key role in the drafting of the BP and writing the aid effectiveness progress reports. While developing countries provide some input into these processes, this approach is hardly led by developing countries.
Given that HLF4 sought to 'enlarge the tent' by bringing new development actors to the table, any post-HLF4 structure would need to be, by necessity, inclusive, representative, and legitimate, as recognized by the PBIG. Compared to the DAC, both the WP-EFF and DCF have been praised for their willingness to be inclusive and democratic by taking into account the voices of Southern partners and engaging a broad range of stakeholders. The WP-EFF and DCF are steps in the right direction that should be built upon when thinking about the Global Partnership.
Brenda Killen and Andrew Rogerson (2010) have examined the global governance of development co-operation against the criteria of legitimacy (understood as inclusivity) and effectiveness (referring to the ability of an institution to deliver results). This framing (and their analysis), however, does not fully capture the legitimacy and effectiveness issues facing institutions governing international development co-operation. It is more useful to start from a broader understanding of legitimacy that captures its many components. In their discussion of legitimacy and the DCF, Graves and Burall (2008) make a useful distinction between different types of legitimacy that are essential for fostering inclusiveness and effecting change in the governance of development co-operation, as well as policy and practice. Graves and Burall (2008) make a case for: input legitimacy, which consists of participation, discussion, and information exchange; throughput legitimacy, which refers to the quality of deliberation; and output legitimacy, which refers to impact or effectiveness. This categorization speaks to the issue of legitimacy as not only something that is inherently right but also to what it can achieve in a concrete sense. In other words, it is not enough to say that different actors should be grouped around the table and be given a voice (input legitimacy). Ultimately what matters is the impact that they will have on policy (output legitimacy) and the nature and quality of those policy changes (throughput legitimacy). Building on Graves and Burall's analysis, we also discuss developing country ownership of the global agenda and capacity for engagement as important contributors to legitimacy. The challenge for members of the PBIG will be to strike a balance between these various types of legitimacy to ensure that the Global Partnership has input, throughput, and output legitimacy.
Input and throughput legitimacy
In terms of input legitimacy, the WP-EFF's membership was neither universal nor necessarily viewed as being representative of developing countries' interests. Nevertheless, those involved in the WP-EFF praise it for the democratization process it underwent over its lifespan, which improved input legitimacy by affording developing countries (and civil society) greater roles and say within the WP-EFF. Moreover, the WP-EFF demonstrated flexibility in considering various issues that were important to different members across its membership. The WP-EFF had several work-streams in the form of task teams and clusters. The five clusters were ownership and accountability, country systems, transparent and responsible aid, assessing progress, and managing for development results. The clusters had subgroups responsible for advancing work in key areas through research and analysis. The sub-task teams reported back to their respective cluster, which then fed analysis and recommendations into WP-EFF discussions. These work-streams allowed likeminded groups among development partners to establish work programs, maintain dialogue on areas of mutual interest, make recommendations to the broader WP-EFF, and provide input to the BP. They evidently contributed to enhanced learning and knowledge-sharing within and outside the WP-EFF. These processes not only contributed to input legitimacy but also throughput legitimacy in the form of higher quality deliberations based on the evidence and analysis (even if the increasing number of subgroups did lead to criticisms that the WP-EFF had become overly bureaucratic). 19 The monitoring survey and the independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration also contributed to throughput legitimacy in this sense.
The DCF, on the other hand, has universal membership and affords all development actors an opportunity to engage in mutual dialogue, which provides it with a certain amount of input legitimacy. However, it is hindered by the rigidity of UN decision-making processes which are consensus-based and thus slow and inefficient, making it an unattractive venue for DAC donors. Its mandate is also limited in the sense that it does not have a formal decision-making or normsetting role; it is largely a forum for discussion. In terms of throughput legitimacy, the SecretaryGeneral produces a report for the DCF for each meeting which reviews trends in development and contributes to the quality of debates in development co-operation more generally. The DCF's work on mutual accountability has also made a valuable contribution in this area (particularly since this principle is one of the lesser understood Paris principles) and contributed to the aid effectiveness monitoring process. While the DCF's raison d'être is explicitly related to the need to democratize discussions on development co-operation, the forum has been criticized for duplicating what was being done elsewhere. For instance, the OECD-DAC worked on policy coherence and the WP-EFF worked on aid before the DCF did. Conversely, this point may be moot given that the establishment of the DCF was a de facto indication that organizations doing work in these areas required greater input legitimacy.
The PBIG will need to clarify how various components of the Global Partnership, namely the Steering Committee, OECD-UNDP joint support team, and ministerial meetings will contribute to both input and throughput legitimacy. Busan outcomes included Building Blocks and other initiatives that afforded likeminded development actors the opportunity to voluntarily commit to advancing progress in key areas of importance, such as gender equality and results.
20 These initiatives also have the potential to contribute to improving input and throughput legitimacy, depending on who they involve (currently, many of the building blocks tend to be dominated by donors), how they are managed, what their work programs entail, and their role in the Global Partnership. At the time of writing, it is not clear how research and analysis (moving past monitoring and evaluation of commitments) will feed into the work of the Global Partnership; the clusters and their associated task teams carried out this function in the WP-EFF. To ensure the Global Partnership has throughput legitimacy, the PBIG will need to consider if and how building blocks and related governance structures will feed into high-quality analysis and debates to inform decision making.
Output legitimacy
Regarding output legitimacy, an important consideration is the Global Partnership's effectiveness in effecting change or, in other words, its positive influence on the current system through its decision-making process as well as monitoring and evaluation. This implies being aware of trade-offs between inclusiveness (for instance, large membership and 'enlarging the tent') and achieving results (as consensus becomes more difficult to achieve). This issue has already been discussed by the PBIG, which debated the merits of representation vis-à-vis efficiency for the Steering Committee of the Global Partnership during its second meeting in 19 At the first PBIG meeting, participants agreed that it was necessary to avoid creating a governance structure that has too many layers and is overly bureaucratic, favouring a 'global light' approach (DCD/DAC/EFF/M 2012, 6). 20 For a full list of these initiatives and their respective members, see Open Forum (2012).
April 2012, finally agreeing that there should be a balance in terms of efficiency, representativeness, and capability (PBIG 2012) . It is unclear what this will look like in practice.
There are a number of factors that the BP should consider with regard to output legitimacy. One consideration is the extent to which actors must accept the tension between effectiveness in changing development partners' behaviour and inclusivity. The BP already recognizes that, to a certain extent, full consensus may not be possible on all issues (or even desirable). The BP explicitly stresses common principles but differentiated approaches for development actors. Voluntary initiatives provide likeminded actors an opportunity to advance progress on key issues on which consensus is lacking (although it is unclear how these will fit into the Global Partnership). While the multiple layers of commitment increase the likelihood of fragmentation, this approach may reflect the flexibility required for the Global Partnership to manage the diversity of development actors and the need for context-specific approaches across developing countries.
21 SSDC providers have already made it clear that they will not participate in the future monitoring framework (WP-EFF 2012, 6 ), but they are nevertheless at the negotiating table, which is the first step to a more inclusive aid architecture. They have also been asked to articulate how they plan to participate in the Global Partnership. The Global Partnership should be structured in a way that allows for this diversity of perspectives and approaches, reducing the need for full consensus across all areas of concern, and in turn easing the tension between inclusivity and effectiveness. The transition from the old governance structure to something broader means accepting less consensus and the tensions between inclusivity and effectiveness that accompany a more legitimate development co-operation architecture.
Another consideration is how change will be assessed. As demonstrated in the Paris monitoring and evaluation processes, a narrow focus on quantitative technical measures misses a large part of the story and has the potential to overlook outcomes. The PBIG has agreed that Busan commitments should be monitored by quantitative and qualitative analysis (WP-EFF 2012, 5), which will provide a richer understanding of development progress. It has also agreed to draw on existing information sources and analyses. In this context, it will be important to ensure that these sources of information are both Southern and Northern. The PBIG will also need to ensure that the global indicators, while light, are still comprehensive, especially given that global monitoring frameworks (like the Paris indicators) are critical for obtaining agreement with donors on mutual accountability frameworks at country level (Martin and Watts 2012) . Matthew Martin and Richard Watts (2012) point out that a comprehensive framework would not necessarily detract from a 'global light' approach as various other monitoring processes, such as the DCF/UNDP mutual accountability and transparency survey, DAC reporting, and the International Aid Transparency Initiative, for example, already report on key areas of the Busan commitments. Given that SSDC providers have refused to participate in the global monitoring framework, drawing from existing DAC-donor monitoring processes would be a cost-effective and logical approach to creating a comprehensive framework.
Ownership and the Global Partnership's mandate
The extent to which the governance structure engages on non-aid issues and how will also impact its legitimacy. This issue reflects the tension between inclusivity and effectiveness in the Global Partnership. With a narrow mandate, it may be easier for the Global Partnership to achieve the objectives that it sets for itself and to become a credible voice, as opposed to trying to do too much. On the other hand, the Global Partnership may need to consider the longstanding priorities of developing countries, such as policy coherence for development as suggested by Brazil in the first PBIG meeting, if it is to have full input, throughput, and output legitimacy. This consideration also relates to developing countries' ownership over the priorities of the Global Partnership. Prior to Busan, African countries argued for the establishment of more 'inclusive, compact and strategically-oriented monitoring mechanisms with strong Southern leadership and ownership' (NEPAD 2011). The legitimacy of the Global Partnership will also be determined by the extent to which its mandate and function takes into consideration their concerns.
Developing countries have historically argued for reform of the development co-operation architecture and for a more equitable and representative system of global governance as means to address these broader economic issues. 22 They have made it clear that the donor-recipient approach, as seen in North-South flows, is outdated. Prior to Busan, they called for a new development partnership approach based on Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Eight, strengthening global partnerships (WP-EFF 2011b, 7), which includes commitments on trade, finance, debt, technology and knowledge transfers, and addressing the needs of least developed countries. CSOs support this broader agenda (BetterAid 2011). In addition, SSDC providers deliver far more than just aid, so examining their co-operation (and that of traditional donors) from a more holistic perspective that considers aid and non-aid flows would provide a clearer picture on overall development co-operation between countries. This approach would also necessitate coordination between the Global Partnership and other fora such as the DCF, OECD, and G20, which look at broader issues relating to trade, investment, and so on.
The PBIG will need to wrestle with the tensions between narrow and broad mandates for the Global Partnership. A narrow mandate may help to ensure that discussions are more focused, decisions are easily made, and monitoring and evaluation are more targeted. As demonstrated after Paris though, this approach does not necessarily guarantee behavioural change. On one hand, the question of incentives that engage SSDC providers on a narrower agenda also remains, especially if it means less of a break from the historically DAC-donor-dominated Paris agenda. On the other hand, it is not clear that a Global Partnership with a broad mandate would offer the right incentives for DAC donors to engage on issues beyond aid, especially when other organizations they currently fund, such as the OECD, already address these issues. Already there are divergent views within the PBIG on the extent to which the Global Partnership should engage with broader issues, with some participants concerned that additional issues, such as engaging on the post-MDGs agenda, might overstretch the partnership (WP-EFF 2012, 3) and others pointing out that there is plenty of unfinished business on aid.
Another option is for the Global Partnership to do both-adopt a holistic approach to development co-operation and at the same time carve out space to address issues specifically related to aid. Such an approach could provide the Global Partnership with the flexibility to meet the BP's commitment to common principles and differentiated responsibilities and ensure that its mandate reflects the concerns of all actors. It may also create greater opportunities for interaction between the Global Partnership and relevant fora. The Global Partnership could be structured to include broader discussions on development at the ministerial level that link up to the work other fora, such as the UN, are doing in areas related to climate change, sustainable development, the MDGs, the post-MDGs agenda, policy coherence, and so on. It could play an important role in coordinating across the development co-operation architecture to minimize duplication of efforts and improve coherence. Outcomes from other fora could also serve as inputs into the ministerial-level meetings alongside more detailed and technical work resulting from the joint OECD-UNDP support team and country-level monitoring and evaluation. To ensure that the unfinished aid agenda continues to receive attention, the ministerial-level meetings could devote space (one day for example) to looking specifically at aid. One function for the joint support team and Steering Committee could be to provide strategic direction, research findings, and monitoring and evaluation outcomes that focus specifically on aid. While this approach may not mean that the Global Partnership is formally responsible for monitoring and evaluation of a holistic development agenda, it could serve as a compromise to ensure that a broader range of issues is discussed and linked to BP commitments, addressing concerns for a broader mandate and the unfinished aid agenda.
One of the benefits of the WP-EFF was that it was able to adapt to new issues and concerns as they arose-its governance structure and work streams evolved accordingly. Regardless of which mandate (narrow or broad) the Global Partnership adopts, it should be structured in such a way that allows for evolution as issues, priorities, and challenges facing development cooperation change.
Capacity to engage
A final issue to consider is the question of capacity for developing countries to engage in monitoring, evaluation, and decision-making processes under the BP. Compared to developing countries, DAC donors are considerably better equipped to engage with the Global Partnership and have greater capacity to feed inputs into decision-making processes. While formal representation and ensuring that the mandate of the Global Partnership reflects developing country concerns (in other words, that they have some ownership over how it is established and what it entails) are important, the capacity of developing countries for continued and meaningful engagement in these processes is critical to legitimacy. The Global Partnership may need to include support mechanisms that enable developing countries to engage more fully in the policy-making process. Such support may also contribute to ameliorating the power imbalance between donors and recipients that results from differences in capacity. This approach, however, would require human and financial resources and at this point it is unclear who will be funding the Global Partnership, what their priorities will be, and how much they will offer. Going forward, supporting developing countries could be achieved through funding pools that allow trained nationals from developing countries to participate as well as through mechanisms that allow knowledge transfer between those developing countries that are already heavily involved in the process and those that lack the human and financial capacity to get involved.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The aid effectiveness agenda has come a long way in the last decade, but the aid architecture has become increasingly complex and incoherent. While the Paris Declaration provided a blueprint with clear goals and targets (which were mostly not met), the BP-despite being more inclusive and having stronger input from developing countries, new donors, and civil societymoved away from concrete targets, offered few specific commitments, and proposed the Global Partnership, the details of which are at the time of writing being debated. It acknowledged that the aid landscape had changed with the emergence of new actors and agreed on the need for goals in areas such as the untying of aid, transparency, and predictability and use of country systems (with partner country leadership), but without being specific about the extent to which the goals will be achieved and how responsibilities will be shared. This paper was partly motivated by the BP's lack of specificity. Our objective was to outline what the post-Busan governance structure, represented by the Global Partnership, should consider. After discussing the background and historical context of debates about aid effectiveness, including activities of the WP-EFF and DCF, we drew on lessons learnt from these fora to discuss the factors that the Global Partnership should consider in moving the aid effectiveness agenda forward. Of course, we recognize that the details of the Global Partnership have yet to be hammered out and that discussions are ongoing at the PBIG level. Once formally established, this partnership will have a key role to play as Busan targets and voluntary building blocks are implemented over the coming months. In particular, we focused on inclusiveness, representativeness, legitimacy, effectiveness, ownership, and developing country capacity for engagement as necessary conditions for the governance of aid after Busan.
In closing, we offer the following conclusions recommendations. First, the input legitimacy of the Global Partnership will be determined by the extent to which developing countries have ownership over the international agenda and capacity to engage in the Global Partnership's governing structures.
Second, to ensure throughput legitimacy-high quality evidence-based discussions and policymaking-the Global Partnership will require analytical inputs that move past simple monitoring and evaluation. Participants in the Global Partnership will need to decide how the partnership's associated structures, as well as the work of other institutions, such as universities, think tanks, civil society organizations, and multilateral organizations, will contribute. In this context, it will be important to ensure that discussions are informed by Northern and Southern perspectives.
Third, the monitoring of Busan commitments at the global level should be informed by a comprehensive set of indicators that draw on existing monitoring processes to the fullest extent possible.
Fourth, the Global Partnership needs to have a clearly defined and focused agenda that is simultaneously flexible enough to accommodate a diversity of perspectives-this will reduce tensions between inclusivity and effectiveness. Regarding the unfinished aid agenda, even a narrow mandate that concentrates on aid issues will need to afford space for a discussion on development from of holistic perspective, which has long been a priority for most developing countries.
